But it is, in fact, so objective an analysis of Hinduism that it will explain a great deal of modern India's difficulties in stamping out castes. All we need to remember at this point is that "what is transcended is also preserved [SLI, p. We will at each point, though not in as overwhelming a manner, state a fact or proposition and then proceed to an Observation; in a word, the polemical movement in the LOGIC follows right alongside, and inseparably, with the affirmative statement.
On the contrary, he deals with thought, and the logical form of the Universal there is the Notion. Speculative philosophy must not be accused of making negation, or Nothing, its end: Nothing is the end of philosophy as little as Reality is the truth" [SLI, p. But it must not be imagined that Hegel is only arguing with other philosophers, though that is his world. Because, however, what was most concrete with him was Thought, and because this early in the LOGIC when he deals with Something, he is already dealing with it as "the first negation of the negation," Lenin gets furious with him at this point and returns to a warm feeling toward Engels by referring to the quotation about "abstract and abstruse Hegelianism" [LCW 38, p.
And yet it is only a few short pages beyond this when dealing with finitude and against the Kantian thing-in-itself [that] Lenin remarks that this whole attack on the Thing-in-itself is "very profound" and again "SEHR GUT!! Thus, it is near Hegel's remark against the critical philosophy, i.
Hegel: Social and Political Thought | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
This distinction is proper only to dialectical development and is unknown to the metaphysical which includes the Critical philosophy" [SLI, p. It is here that Lenin has his first definition of dialectic as the doctrine of the identity of opposites, before which generalization, he writes: "This is very profound; the thing-in-itself and its transformation into the thing-for-other cf.
Hegel proceeds next to analyze Finitude and Ought. Lenin is again moved here to speak about the profound analysis Hegel makes of the Finite, saying "The Finite?
Meaning and Language in Hegel's Philosophy
Being, in general? In the section which follows on Infinity, the critical point is transition: "Ideality 2 may be called the Quality of Infinity; but, as it is essentially the process of Becoming, it is a Transition, like that of Becoming in Determinate Being, and it must now be indicated" [SLI, p. Two other observations followed this one, one on "Infinite Progress": "Bad Infinity," 3 says Hegel, like progress to infinity, is really no different than Ought, "the expression of a contradiction, which pretends to be the solution and the ultimate" [SLI, p.
At this point here, during the correspondence with [C. James] and [Grace Lee] in , Grace [Lee] developed her thoughts on this chapter as one dealing with the developing subject as it first arose, B. She seemed to think that Being-For-One coming from Being-For-Self was unclear to Lenin because he did not understand abstract labor as we did. I doubt that was the reason since in the Doctrine of Being, we are, comparatively, at a low stage of development in Hegelian thought.
Indeed, Lenin here notes evidently it struck him for the first time that the self-development of the concept in Hegel is related to the entire history of philosophy. What is true is Hegel's very sharp opposition to so-called independence in the One: "Independence having reached its quintessence in the One which is for itself, is abstract and formal, destroying itself; it is the highest and most stubborn error, which takes itself for highest truth; appearing, more concretely, as abstract freedom, pure ego, and further as Evil.
It is freedom which goes so far astray as to place its essence in this abstraction, flattering itself that, being thus by itself, it possesses itself in its purity" [SLI, p.
In the first observation on Pure Quantity, as well as in the second observation on Kant's "Antinomy of the Indivisibility and Infinite Divisibility of Time, Space and Matter," the concept that we are approaching is that of Continuous and Discrete magnitude. Hegel protests that Kant's proofs are "a forced and useless tortuosity," "an advocate's proof" [SLI, p. Discreteness, like Continuity, is a moment of Quantity and in fact it is only both moments, their unity that is, that produces Quantum.
At the same time, both in this chapter and in chapter II on "Quantum," we sense Hegel's sharp distaste for mathematical proof as being unworthy of philosophy, even though at its start, in the theorems of Pythagoras, they were of the essence, and there is no doubt also of their importance, and in fact necessity, to Newtonian science and differential and integral calculus.
Although I know next to nothing of this, and I am sure that modern mathematics which has reached into economics, automation, and space science, that in essence all that Hegel says here is inescapably true as is all that he says on "Bad Infinity," and I dare say that any infinity that is not human is bad The observation on Nodal Lines Lenin copies out nearly in full.
Understanding prefers to fancy identity and change to be of that indifferent and external kind which applies to the quantitative" [SLI, p. To sharpen his own very different concept, Hegel goes over to this question of gradual transition of Quantity to Quality in Ethics, and says, "A more or less suffices to transgress the limit of levity, where something quite different, namely, crime, appears; and thus right passes over into wrong, and virtue into vice" [SLI, p.
In German the paired terms idealism and ideality are used more frequently than in English, in a sense parallel to realism and reality. Irreducible, fundamental substances of the universe according to Leibniz, of which the prime monad is God. The Eleatics were a school founded by Parmenides who upheld a doctrine of monism wherein reality is one, motionless, undifferentiated, and unchanging. The chief ancient Greek atomists were Democritus and Epicurus, who held that reality is composed of indeterminate particles called atoms, which acquire determinacies such as color and shape only through their interaction with human sense organs.
In Hegel continuous magnitude is a quantity which "propagates itself without negation Discrete magnitude is a quantity that is noncontinuous or interrupted; it breaks up into "a multitude of ones. Part 4, on the Doctrine of the Notion, will appear in the May issue. These notes were first written in and appear in print for the first time. All material in brackets as well as footnotes has been supplied by the editors.
The profundity of Hegel is seen in the fact that even where he thinks that something is relatively unessential and is, therefore, mere show, that even there the show is also objective. Hegel hits out against all idealisms, of Leibniz, Kant, or Fichte.
And again: "Show is Essence in one of its determinations. Essence thus appears. Show is the phenomenon of Essence in itself" [LCW 38, p. Lenin further notes that in this section on the Reflection of Essence, Hegel again accuses Kant of subjectivism and insists on the objective validity of Show, "of the immediate given," and notes: "The term, 'GIVEN' is common with Hegel in general. The little philosophers dispute whether one should take as basis the Essence or the immediately given Kant, Hume, Machists 1.
We will deal here with the three developments in Essence: first, simple self-relation or Identity; secondly, Variety [Difference]; and thirdly, Contradiction. But before Hegel develops these three, he has an observation on so-called "Laws of Thought," which allegedly prove that A cannot be at one and the same time A and not be A.
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That is absolutely hilarious. Every concrete thing, every concrete something stands in diverse and often contradictory relations to all others, ergo, it is itself and another" [LCW 38, p. As for the observation which follows on the law of Contradiction where Hegel defines Contradiction as the "root of all movement and life, and it is only insofar as it contains a Contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity" [SLII, p. LCW 38, p.
And as we move from Absolute to Determined [Determinate] Ground and approach Complete Ground, it becomes quite clear that manifoldness or content-determinations could be used indiscriminately so that you could cite something as much FOR as AGAINST something, which is exactly what Socrates correctly argued against as Sophistry, because, of course, such conclusions do not exhaust the thing-in-itself in the sense of "grasp of the connection of things which contain them all" [SLII, p.
The Meaning of Hegel's Logic/Introduction
The continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the dialectical working out of the history of human thought, science and technique. We have now reached the third sub-section of Ground-Condition, which could be defined as History. In , G. James was no help whatsoever; indeed, he could never develop the strong point of Grace on philosophy. It is the self-mediating, self-repelling, self-transcending relation of Ground which externalizes itself in the immediate existent.
The exact statement from Hegel reads: "When all the Conditions of a fact are present, it enters into Existence. Now at this point, Lenin wrote: "Very good!
What has the Absolute Idea and Idealism to find here? Remarkable, this 'derivation' of Existence" [LCW 38, p. The new contradictions will once again show that facts, facts, facts can also hide[:] "the unity of Form is submerged" [SLII, p. And of course we know that our historic epoch, much more than Hegel's, demands more of reality than just a sound of "immediates.
So that once again we need self-transcendence and therefore, in the expression "the fact is before it exists," we recognize the process of emergence of something new, and in its emergence we therefore get the transition to Existence. So we can no longer merely contrast Appearance to Essence, because, while there may be much Appearance that is only "show," it also contains Essence itself which in turn will soon mean we are moving to a real crisis or Actuality.
The real tendency, as well as actuality, that we should have before us in studying this section on Appearance is Stalinism and its non-essential critique in Trotskyism. That is to say, if Essence-the present stage of capitalism or the present stage of the counter-revolutionary appearance of the labor bureaucracy-must appear, then Stalinism, which has appeared, is not just any old bureaucracy that has no connection with a new economic state of world development.
On the contrary, the Appearance-Stalinism-and the Essence-state-capitalism-are one and the same, or the Form of a new Content. Trotskyism, on the other hand, by putting up a Chinese wall between what is mere Appearance to what is true Essence and to him, the Essence is not capitalism, but the form of workers' state has not been able to analyze either Stalinism or state-capitalism.
G. Mure a Study of Hegel's Logic
I mean, either Stalinism as a mere perversion of the early Soviets, or Stalinism as the absolute opposite of that early workers' state. Lenin keeps stressing at this point "the remarkably materialistic" analysis that flows from this objective analysis which will, of course, become the basis of Marx's analysis of the economic laws of capitalism. Finally, "The essence here is that both the World of Appearance and the World which is in and for itself are essentially MOMENTS of knowledge of nature by man, stages, changes or deepening of knowledge. The movement of the world in itself ever further and further FROM the world of appearance-that is what is not yet visible in Hegel.
Do not the 'moments' of conception with Hegel have significance of 'moments' of transition?